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National victimhood is rarely immutable or permanent; instead, it 
reflects the transformations in society and ideas about citizenship. 
In Cold War historiography, the Japanese empire—a behemoth that 
controlled more than 7.5 million square kilometres of land and sea and 
ruled over millions of imperial subjects—has mostly been analysed 
through the lens of national history. This national framework has often 
discounted the importance of empire and ignored its many legacies. One 
consequence of this limited vision was the categorisation of Japanese 
victimhood along the lines of gender and the civilian-military divide. 
These divisions and omissions were not limited to the non-Japanese—
even former “defenders of empire” might find themselves left out of the 
mainstream accounts of history.





The Soviet Red Army’s attack on Japan’s puppet-kingdom of Manchukuo 
in northeast China in August 1945 left indelible scars in the memory of 
its survivors. Crossing the Soviet-Manchukuo border in the small hours 
of August 9, the Soviet troops advanced at lightning speed towards the 
Manchukuo capital of Shinkyō (present day Changchun) and further 
south, wreaking havoc and causing uncontrollable panic in Japanese 
settlements along the way. The vaunted Kwantung Army, stationed 
in Manchukuo to protect the empire’s frontiers, was overwhelmed by 
the speed of its Soviet counterpart and hastily withdrew south, leaving 
over 200,000 Japanese settlers defenceless in the face of the onrushing 
enemy. In the 1930s, these agricultural pioneers had left the overcrowded 
Japanese home islands for Manchuria in search of land and livelihood; 
now they had to leave their new land and new lives and flee south. Many 
lost family members during the escape, and some voluntarily left their 
children with the local Chinese or Manchus to ensure their safety.1
The brief Soviet-Japanese War of August-September 1945 has been a 
source of Japanese national trauma ever since, both for its survivors and 
the larger society that learned about it from history books and memoirs. 
This history was influenced significantly by the memoir genre—the 
recollections of witnesses and survivors published during the post-war 
decades. Many of these memoirs, some of which became bestsellers, 
concentrated on the tortuous escape of Japanese residents from the 
Soviets and the losses suffered along the way. When the guns stopped 
firing in Manchuria, the Soviets laid down the law and disarmed the 
Japanese military; the civilian population that had been displaced by 
the invasion and that had not managed to return to Japan was placed 
in internment camps. Thus, following the storm of war there came the 
Soviet occupation, which imposed new difficulties on the Japanese 
residents. During the following year, civilians were slowly repatriated, 
except those who decided to remain in China of their own volition. 
Thousands of Japanese skilled workers chose to stay because their 
expertise in operating industrial facilities was highly sought after by the 
Chinese authorities who were keen to rebuild the economy; and many 
young Japanese women elected to marry local men and stay on.2
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In short, the empire’s downfall in northeast Asia, while violent during 
the days of battle, was not only about suffering and victimhood for the 
Japanese residents on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, it has entered 
postwar Japanese collective memory predominantly through stories of 
violence and frantic escape from the Soviet enemy, of looting, rape, and 
untimely deaths. These repatriation memoirs—hikiagemono, many of 
them authored by civilian, often female, writers—achieved considerable 
popularity in postwar Japan.3 In these recollections, the victimhood of 
Japanese civilians left at the mercy of the fearsome invading army and 
hostile locals was a recurring theme.
Despite the diversity of experiences depicted in them , these 
recollections paint only part of the picture. They convey faithfully 
the overwhelming pain and misery of the survivors; nevertheless, the 
suffering narrated as indiscriminate violence against civilians was 
actually victimhood categorised along specific lines. The first line of 
division was national: the majority of memoirs prioritised Japanese 
suffering, rarely mentioning the victimhood of other peoples in the 
region—particularly that of Japanese colonial subjects (Chinese, 
Manchus, and Koreans)—before or after the Soviet attack. It is true that 
the nationalisation of victimhood was hardly unique to Japan; in the 
century of two deadly world wars, victim narratives provided the perfect 
raw material for national identities across the world.4 Nevertheless, 
the post-war narratives of Japanese victimhood were peculiar—and 
important—because they captured the transition from the wartime 
imperial mindset to the postwar Japanese national mentality.
The second and less studied division—contained within the national 
framework—happened along gender lines. Even within the nationally-
contained narratives of the empire’s fall in northeast China, Japanese 
suffering was further divided into two categories. The first category, 
embodying the majority of Japanese experiences in Manchukuo and thus 
becoming the mainstream narrative, was about the sacrifices of Japanese 
civilians. Humiliation and pain came in all shapes, but civilian suffering 
was most poignantly captured in the abuse of Japanese women: the pain 
of a mother who had lost her children trying to escape the enemy, or the 
trampled honour of a young girl who had been raped by Soviet soldiers 
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and so on. This category dominated the people’s history of Manchukuo—
still preserved in the nostalgia for the lost dream of building a model 
colony, “an ideal state,” among some Japanese citizens.5 
I first noticed the existence of a second category of Japanese 
Manchurian victimhood during my doctoral research into the so-called 
“Siberian Internment” of Japanese former servicemen in Soviet forced-
labour camps. The internment was about the suffering of men, the many 
stories of soldiers, held in captivity that were pushed to the margins 
of postwar Japanese collective memory.6 Just like the hikiagemono, the 
internment memoirs start in Manchuria; a few days after disarming the 
surrendering Kwantung Army, the Soviets rounded up one half-million 
men and sent them to the USSR as forced labourers. The majority of 
these captives would stay in the USSR for the next three to four years; 
while a thousand or so “war criminals” convicted by Soviet courts would 
remain in Siberia until late 1956.7 Their captivity—a dark chapter in 
modern Japanese history—is still little known internationally. Even after 
they finally returned home, many of the Siberian internees continued to 
suffer from suspicion and discrimination in Japanese society, and their 
victimhood was not acknowledged nationwide until the end of the Cold 
War.
Thus, the gendered division on which I base this essay was 
perpetrated in Manchuria by the Soviets. The USSR required young men 
who could give their labour to the rebuilding of its war-torn economy; 
it thus selected those who could do the hard work. As a result, in the 
months following Japan’s defeat a total of 600,000 military—women, 
children, and the elderly—were sent back to Japan as the “remnants 
of empire.” In this paper, based on multilingual source material, I 
demonstrate how even within the exclusively Japanese national history 
of defeat at Soviet hands, the humiliating history of imperial downfall 
prioritised civilian—and female—suffering, whereas the Japanese 
male and almost all non-Japanese suffering was largely overlooked. I 
emphasise how the collapse of the multinational empire was categorised 
in narrowly national and—within this national history—gendered terms. 
I start with an overview of the nation-centred narratives of victimhood, 
before moving on to an analysis of Siberian narratives of hardship and 
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humiliation marginalised in Cold War Japan—just like the suffering of 
the victims of Japan’s empire.
From Imperial Consciousness to National Narratives 
Towards the end of the half-century of its existence, Japan’s Asian empire 
(1895-1945) had managed to instill in its subjects—or at least the Japanese 
population of the home islands—an ambitiously pan-Asian imperial 
consciousness that went well beyond the borders of the Japanese 
archipelago. This mindset, based on the idea of liberating Asia from the 
yoke of western imperialism, promised to unite the “eight corners of the 
world under one roof.”8 The Japanese empire’s collapse, however, was 
followed by an almost instantaneous reversal of this imperial mindset. 
According to historian Barak Kushner, “Japan’s inhabitants were used 
to empire; the idea and actuality of it were ideologically satisfying and 
formed part of their self-image and existence”—and now they had 
to leave the empire behind.9 The imperial consciousness was soon—
perhaps too soon—replaced by a narrowly national Japanese narrative, 
absent from which was not only the expansionist rhetoric, but also any 
mention of the millions of non-Japanese former imperial subjects. 
To be sure, the empire’s Korean, Taiwanese and other subjects had 
never been equal with the Japanese even when Korea and Taiwan were 
formally part of Japan.10 But as the empire disappeared into oblivion 
during the Allied Occupation, Japan commenced its abrupt transition 
back to being simply a nation-state. Just as the ethnic Japanese nationals 
abroad were being returned to their home islands, the non-Japanese 
former imperial subjects moved to Japan by the empire were now called 
“third country nationals.”11  There was no place for the latter in the new 
national identity, which was narrowly defined along ethnic lines. During 
the transition from the wartime expansionist empire to the postwar 
exclusivist nation-state, history and memory would also have to fit 
within these strict national boundaries. 
Both during the Allied Occupation and subsequently as Japan 
acquired the role of a Cold War US ally, the new national narrative 
favoured a separation between the pre-war and the post-war.12 Japanese 
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victimhood became an important component of the new national 
discourse, helping to establish a break with the war and diverting 
attention away from Japan’s responsibility as a perpetrator.13 The moral 
high ground afforded by the position of a victim was almost universally 
persuasive; it took only a few years even for some Japanese leftists—
members of the pacifist movement who were perhaps most likely to 
acknowledge Japan’s role as a victimiser of Asian peoples—to become 
preoccupied by Japanese victimhood.14 During the period described 
by Sebastian Conrad as a “clinical separation of Japan from its empire,” 
Japanese victimisation of Asian peoples and of the Allied servicemen 
who had perished in the battlefields of Asia was excluded from the 
new national consciousness.15 In the mainstream narratives of both the 
war and the post-war period, the violent sacrifice of the Japanese people 
became paramount, while other victimhoods were regularly passed 
over in silence. A comparative reading of memoirs and archives shows 
that even writing about experiences where suffering was widespread 
and indiscriminate—for example, in the Soviet labour camps for foreign 
POWs—Japanese memoirists prioritised Japanese victimhood. 
More importantly, when writing about Japanese victimhood that 
readily invites comparison with episodes of Japanese victimisation—
for example, the victimhood of Japanese POWs in Siberia as opposed 
to the victimisation of Allied POWs by the Japanese on the Burma-
Thai Railway—it was often the former that received mention. While 
accounts of sexual abuse of Japanese women by Soviet soldiers are rife 
in the Manchurian hikiagemono, these memoirists hardly ever mention 
the long-term, systematic sexual abuse of Korean, Chinese, Japanese, 
and other Asian “comfort women” by the Imperial Japanese Army. The 
Cold War necessities of being America’s ally reinforced this national 
container of history, reducing Japan’s war in Asia to the Pacific War 
(1941-1945) against the US, and ossifying in Japanese eyes their country’s 
unique victimhood of being “the only nation to have suffered nuclear 
bombing.”16 
Even when isolated from non-Japanese suffering, the account of 
Japanese national victimhood was neither monolithic nor immutable. 
Rather, it was further divided; to put it in straightforward terms, some 
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Japanese victims received more attention than others. The memoirs 
of defeat in Manchukuo are important because they highlight this 
selective construction of national narratives, whereby the hardships and 
humiliation suffered by one group of Japanese citizens was prioritised 
over that of other groups.
Victims par excellence
It is not an exaggeration to say that the Soviet Union was the most 
despised enemy in postwar Japan; it “consistently headed the list of 
‘most hated countries.’”17 There were two major reasons behind this 
indignation, both related to the USSR’s Manchurian invasion. First, at 
the time of the Soviet invasion, the USSR and Japan were still bound by 
the 1941 Neutrality Pact; the Soviet Union announced its renunciation of 
the pact only hours before Red Army troops crossed into Manchukuo. 
This was described by Japanese historians as a backstabbing of Japan 
in a time of crisis—the Soviets had entered the war between the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.18 Second, even as Joseph Stalin 
was planning to invade Manchukuo, the Japanese harboured the hope 
that the USSR would help mediate a better peace deal with the Allies.19 
The invasion was a betrayal for the Japanese; one can even say that the 
latter saw themselves as victims par excellence vis-à-vis the Soviets.
This righteous fury with the Soviet attacker became more acute 
once victors and vanquished came into actual contact. When Red Army 
soldiers started looting the possessions of Japanese residents, this 
added insult to injury. Japanese memoirists recounted with indignation 
the propensity of the invaders to confiscate whatever they liked—
wristwatches and cameras were especially prized among the Soviet 
officers. Furumi Tadayuki, a high-ranking officer in the Manchukuo 
government, remembered the search carried out in his house by the 
Soviet officers who came to arrest him; the arrest soon turned into a 
looting, with the Soviets eventually marching off with his “camera, 
sewing machine, and gramophone.”20 The plunder was carried out at the 
state level, too—on August 30, 1945, the USSR’s State Defence Committee 
issued an order “to transport trophy equipment from Manchuria”—
many Japanese-owned factories and plants were dismantled and simply 
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hauled away on Soviet freight trains.21 
Yet of all the offences committed by the Soviets, the rape of Japanese 
women was perhaps the most infuriating. Almost every memoir of 
the fall of Manchuria mentions it; as argued by anthropologist Mariko 
A. Tamanoi, “none of the victims of rape committed by Russians 
has ever written a memoir, but the authors of memoirs often write 
about such victims.”22 Furumi Tadayuki remembered young Japanese 
women shaving their heads and dressing in Buddhist robes to avoid 
the attention of potential rapists.23 Although it is impossible to place 
subjective human suffering on any scale, it should be remembered that 
rape was one among many atrocities endured by Japanese women, and 
it was perhaps not the most horrible experience. For many narrators, 
the most devastating experience, recounted in memoir after memoir, 
was observing the deaths of their children.24 Despite this, rape became 
a central component of civilian memoirs of the fall of Manchukuo, 
the one that resonated most with their readership. Traditional gender 
stereotypes played a part in the perception of Soviet crimes; it was as if 
in the rape by the Soviet enemy all of Japan’s national humiliation was 
contained. Sataka Makoto, an author and critic, summarised it well when 
he said, “the story of the Soviet army violating Japanese women became 
the archetypal image of the Soviet Union during the post-war.”25 
Due to the limitations of space, I can only briefly analyse one 
memoir—undoubtedly the most important account of Manchuria’s 
fall—Fujiwara Tei’s Nagareru hoshi wa ikite iru (The Shooting Stars Are 
Alive), which was published in 1949.26 Fujiwara wrote this memoir of 
her flight from Manchuria as a kind of last will and testament to her 
children who did not remember the war’s end—the youngest of the 
three had been only a month old when the Soviets invaded Manchukuo. 
She wanted her children to learn about her suffering and that of other 
Japanese civilians. Her readership, however, far exceeded the members 
of her family: the book became a publishing phenomenon in Japan and 
remains in print even today; in the post-war decades, it has been made 
into a film and several TV dramas. And its popularity was not confined 
to Japan; according to historian Michael Kim, upon its publication in 
Korea, the book became a “phenomenal success and sold out its entire 
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first edition in just three days.”27 Japanese historian Narita Ryūichi has 
described Fujiwara’s account as telling the story of “divisions and rifts in 
the ‘family’ and the Japanese community” that opened in the wake of the 
Soviet-Japanese war.28 The rifts within the family—seen in the fury of the 
Japanese women at the men who left them and their children helpless 
before the enemy—reinforce the gendered division I propose here. The 
memoir thus brought civilian suffering to the forefront and contributed 
to the gendered narratives of the empire’s fall; writing about experiences 
similar to the ones depicted in Fujiwara’s work, historian Lori Watt 
has claimed that “Manchuria was feminized.”29 Moreover, according to 
Narita, Fujiwara’s memoir did not pay enough attention to the “other”—
“the figure of the Korean is not sufficiently mentioned in the book.”30 In 
other words, Fujiwara’s recollections remain confined within the limits 
of the Japanese nation; they popularised the idea of national victimhood 
and served to reinforce the rhetorical national boundaries in post-war 
Japan.
More importantly, Fujiwara’s book etched in the readers’ minds the 
image of a woman who heroically crossed the steppe and swam across 
rivers with her children in tow, refusing to give up. This heroism of the 
civilian mother that challenged the gender stereotype overshadowed the 
shame and misery of the defeated Japanese man unable to protect these 
defenceless mothers and children.
Stories of Siberian Internment in Cold War Japan
Within the Japanese narratives of victimhood at Soviet hands, one 
chapter has only in the past few decades gained a place in the canon of 
national suffering. This chapter started on August 23, 1945, a mere three 
days after the Kwantung Army officers agreed terms of surrender with 
the Soviet military leadership. On this day, the Chairman of the USSR’s 
State Defence Committee, Joseph Stalin, signed a top secret order that 
issued instructions to “select up to 500,000 Japanese […] physically fit to 
work in the conditions of the Far East and Siberia” and to transport them 
to the Soviet Union.31 The order gave a start to the “Siberian Internment” 
of former Japanese servicemen in the USSR—one of the greatest forced 
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migrations in modern history, an odyssey of epic proportions that saw 
an army of Japanese captives transported, exploited for their labour and 
indoctrinated by the victorious Soviet Union. 
The real reasons behind Stalin’s decision to intern Japanese prisoners-
of-war remain hidden in Soviet archives that are still inaccessible to 
historians, over seven decades later. One could point to an obvious 
reason—the desperate need for labour in rebuilding the Soviet economy 
ravaged in the life-and-death conflict against Nazi Germany. This 
easy answer overlooks two important points. Firstly, transporting, 
accommodating, guarding, and feeding a half-million-strong army of 
foreign citizens came at an enormous economic and logistical cost for 
the USSR. Second, the costs of accommodating the foreign POWs—
there were close to 2 million of them in Soviet camps even before the 
arrival of the Japanese—almost always exceeded the returns from their 
labour; thus, the Soviet leadership valued these captives not only as an 
able workforce but also as a potential instrument in the coming Cold 
War. The propaganda chiefs in Moscow were aware of the potential 
contribution foreign POWs could make to extending Soviet influence 
in their respective countries, and sanctioned a meticulous re-education 
and propaganda program aimed at persuading the detainees of the 
advantages of Soviet-style communism. In the four years that it took 
for the majority of the Japanese internees to return home, all of them 
contributed their labour to various Soviet industries, and over 20,000 
of them attended communist schooling—a fact that partly explains the 
suspicion with which the Japanese society greeted their return in the late 
1940s. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the complex set of ideas conjured up by 
the word “Siberia” haunted the Japanese captives even after they finally 
returned home in the late 1940s and early 1950s. A rich combination of 
feelings and memories—indignation at the hardships they endured, 
fascination at having lived in a completely different political system, 
as well as the relief of finally making it back alive to Japan and to their 
loved ones—meant that many Siberian returnees put pen to paper 
following their return. Yet there was another, perhaps more important, 
reason for their decision to document the Siberian Internment as they 
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had experienced it—the need to explain themselves to the society that 
did not seem to trust them, the urge to reclaim their place in post-war 
society as rightful Japanese citizens.
The more than 2,000 memoirs and recollections published by the 
Japanese survivors of Stalin’s POW camps are as diverse as their authors’ 
backgrounds and experiences, but they all document a certain kind of 
victimhood—that of former servicemen illegally detained, exploited, and 
indoctrinated by the enemy. Ubiquitous in these memoirs of victimhood 
are three themes specific to the Soviet labour camps. The first theme 
is the cold: even those internees who were accustomed to the frigid 
winters of northeast China found the harsh climate of Soviet Siberia 
and the Far East extremely demanding; their ordeals were aggravated 
by accommodation often more suitable for cattle than human beings, 
as well as the lack of appropriate clothing. Many of the at least 20,000 
Japanese who died during the first winter of the internment, one of 
the coldest on record, succumbed to cold and diseases compounded 
by frigid temperatures. The second theme is hunger—at least during 
the first two years of the internment, food was scarce in the USSR—
with conservative estimates putting the number of Soviet victims of 
famine in 1946-1947 at around 2 million people32. In such conditions, it 
was not surprising that foreign POWs were constantly underfed. They 
often went to great lengths to fill their bellies: many ate wild berries 
and forest mushrooms, and some boiled tree bark and hunted for small 
forest animals; after poisoning spread, the camp authorities prohibited 
gathering wild food.33 The situation improved from 1947 on as the Soviet 
economy started its recovery, but the misery of the initial months in 
hungry camps remained etched in the memory of survivors. The third 
theme is that of backbreaking work which, in combination with cold 
and hunger, took its toll on the health and morale of the Japanese POWs. 
As a workforce under the general management of the Soviet Ministry 
of the Interior, the mighty NKVD, the internees worked all over the 
Soviet Union in numerous industries and construction projects, often 
assigned to demanding tasks and having to meet daily work quotas too 
hard to finish in a week. This experience was not universal—there were 
regions and camps in which the internees could finish the quota before 
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lunchtime—but the prevailing memory was of extremely demanding 
labour.
These three themes formed what one writer called the “Siberian 
trinity of suffering,” canonised in the many memoirs and recollections 
that appeared during the post-war period.34 Writing from memory 
of what they had experienced—and of course, exaggerating at times 
for effect—these returnees from the Soviet Union felt the need to 
document their own suffering to Japanese society in order to reclaim 
their recognised status as Japanese citizens. Nevertheless, their suffering 
became confined to the margins of national memory for decades. There 
were two major reasons for this neglect. The first reason lies in the 
gender stereotypes associated with military men. To put it simply, male 
soldiers were seen as less deserving than the defenceless civilians of a 
place in the pantheon of victims. Besides the traditional and widespread 
stereotypes of masculinity that prescribe certain behaviour for male 
soldiers (“protectors of the motherland,” “defenders of the frontiers”), 
there were specifically Japanese stereotypes associated with POWs. The 
soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army were advised to “commit suicide 
and not endure the shame of being taken alive”; becoming a POW was a 
shame that could not be washed away.35 Of course, the issue of whether 
or not the Siberian internees were POWs remains contentious to this 
day—they were clearly taken prisoner after laying down arms, but before 
Japan had signed the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September, 1945. 
Moreover, the memoirs are replete with accounts demonstrating that 
the Japanese were tricked by the Soviets into captivity; before putting 
them on trains bound for Siberia, Soviet officers ensured the Japanese 
they were being sent home, to Japan. Nevertheless, for many in post-
war Japanese society, the returnees from the Soviet Union were shameful 
POWs—the ignominious remnants of the failed empire. Almost every 
group in society found something in the Siberian returnees that they 
did not like; for women, they were the men who had failed to protect 
the Japanese civilians in Manchuria, for pacifists, they were the once-
vaunted soldiers of the militarist empire, and for nationalists they were 
the returnees from the hated ideological enemy, the Soviet Union.
This latter point brings us to the second and, in my view, more 
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important reason why accounts of victimhood in Siberia were 
overlooked in post-war Japan in favour of civilian suffering. Both the 
Cold War and Japan’s role as an anti-communist ally of the United States 
in Asia created the necessary prerequisites for the marginalisation of the 
Siberian returnees. Their association with the USSR led to apprehension 
in Japanese society. To begin with, the majority of returnees from the 
USSR returned to Japan in 1948-1949—the two years in which the “reverse 
course” of the US Occupation administration was being implemented. 
The year 1949 saw the Cold War arrive in Japan; it was also the year 
of important setbacks for the American influence in East Asia.36 As a 
result, the Japanese government, press, and society were suspicious of 
leftists, represented in the political sphere by the increasingly belligerent 
Japan Communist Party. Also, the behaviour of some of the returnees 
did not help their cause. Many repatriates arriving in Japan during 
1949 had been converted by their camp instructors; they believed in 
the advantages of the communist system of government and the need 
to overturn the emperor system. Upon their return to Japan, they 
demonstrated recalcitrant behaviour, refusing to cooperate with the 
authorities and terrifying the gathered crowds at the ports and railway 
stations. All of this contributed to the image of a “red repatriate” in 
an increasingly anti-communist Japan. The press played its part in 
sensationalising this image, which was foisted on a majority of the 
repatriates, even though only a fraction of them had displayed allegiance 
to the communist cause. Thus, within a few months after the arrival of 
the “red repatriates” on Japanese shores, the society that had so eagerly 
campaigned for the return of their “brethren” (dōhō) from the unlawful 
Soviet captivity suddenly turned against them. As the mental borders 
of Japanese nationhood were redrawn in the Cold War, even the once 
proud members of the Japanese nation—the defenders of the imperial 
frontiers—came to be seen as insufficiently Japanese. And as victimhood 
narratives took their place in the book of national suffering, the returnees’ 
association with the Soviet Union meant that their suffering—arguably 
harder and more prolonged than that of some other groups—was for 
decades treated with near indifference by the Japanese government, 
which refused to pay them the compensation they demanded for their 
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losses.
In post-war Japan, the defeat by the Soviets hurt especially because 
“ever since the victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese had 
made a fool of Russia” as a backward and wild land.37 It is perhaps for 
this reason that the suffering of soldiers yielded pride of place in the 
popular imagination to the humiliation of innocent and unprotected 
women and children. In writing about the role of the barbaric Soviet 
Union in ending Japan’s empire, it was uncomfortable to talk much about 
the resounding strategic and tactical superiority of the Red Army over 
the once-famed Kwantung Army. Yet the uncivilised features and the 
detestable transgressions of the Soviet soldiers and officers—the looting 
of food and valuables, the rape of the Japanese women, the disregard for 
humanity, law and order—were ubiquitous in hikiagemono. In this way, 
the simplistic victim narratives replaced the unpleasant discussions of 
defeat and failure. 
Conclusion
In today’s Japan, hardly anyone questions the hardships endured by 
the over 600,000 former servicemen who forcefully migrated to the 
Soviet labour camps at the war's end. These days, it is an issue that 
unites, unexpectedly, people who otherwise have very little in common 
or who are even bitterly opposed to each other: during the annual 
commemorative ceremony in Tokyo’s Chidorigafuchi Cemetery on 
August 23—the anniversary of Stalin’s infamous secret order—it is not 
uncommon to witness a speech by the member of the ruling conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party followed by a speech by a representative of 
the Japanese Communist Party. A representative of activist groups 
who had struggled for compensation for the returnees might speak 
immediately after an official from the Japanese government, against 
which that struggle for compensation was once waged. The victimhood 
of the Siberian internees has finally triumphed, even though it had been 
virtually ignored during the period from the 1950s until the 1990s. 
In this paper I have briefly analysed the categorisation of Japanese 
national victimhood at the hands of the Soviet Union at the end of the 
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Second World War. I also traced the evolution of social attitudes towards 
the survivors and victims of the war. As seen in the lives of the Siberian 
internees in postwar Japan, national victimhood is hardly immutable or 
permanent—just like national identity, it reflects the transformations in 
society and ideas about citizenship. The divisions in Japanese national 
victimhood I have analysed were legacies of the Cold War—the global 
ideological confrontation that divided not only countries and continents, 
but also transformed the ways in which histories were written and the 
past remembered. Despite the growing importance of transnational 
approaches to the study of the past, national histories continue to hold 
sway across the world, but especially in East Asia. One of the largest 
contradictions of Cold War historiography was that the Japanese 
empire—a behemoth that controlled more than 7.5 million square 
kilometres of land and sea and ruled over millions of imperial subjects—
has mostly been analysed through the lens of national history. This 
national framework has often discounted the importance of empire and 
ignored its many legacies. The gendered division of Japanese national 
victimhood was a product of this limited vision. These categorisations of 
victimhood disregard the imprint that the empire left on the lives of the 
millions of its non-Japanese subjects—the forced labourers transported 
across the empire, the “comfort women” forced to serve the “empire’s 
defenders” and so on. Yet, as I showed here, these divisions were not 
limited to the non-Japanese—even former “defenders of empire” might 
find themselves left out of the mainstream accounts of history.
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